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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found forty-one-year-old Dwayne A. Bradley guilty of felony trafficking in
methamphetamine. The district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with
three years fixed.

On appeal, Mr. Bradley asserts that the district court abused its

discretion when it admitted certain audio recordings into evidence, or alternatively that it
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial because it erred deciding
a question of law arising during the course of the trial, when it admitted the recordings
into evidence. Mr. Bradley also asserts that the district court erred when it denied his
motion for judgment of acquittal, because the evidence presented to the jury was
insufficient to convict him of trafficking in methamphetamine. Additionally, Mr. Bradley
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his unified sentence
of twelve years, with three years fixed, because the indeterminate portion of the
sentence is excessive.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Bradley had committed the
crime of trafficking in methamphetamine, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 372732B(a)(4). (R., pp.24-25.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable
cause and bound Mr. Bradley over to the district court. (R., p.62.) The State then filed
an Information charging Mr. Bradley with the above offense. (R., pp.63-64.) He entered
a not guilty plea. (R., pp.69-70.)
The case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.122-30, 135-39.) After the opening
statements, the district court granted the State's motion to amend the Information.

1

L.8.) 1

(Tr.,

The Amended Information

Mr. Bradley with

trafficking in methamphetamine, through knowingly possessing methamphetamine in an
amount represented to be 28 grams or more.

(R., pp.133-34.)

The district court

granted the motion to amend the Information because the amendment clarified the
State's theory of the case that Mr. Bradley represented that the weight was 28 grams or
more. (See Tr., p.95, Ls.15-24, p.96, L.14-p.97, L.8.)
During the trial, Sergeant Eric Hildebrandt with the Kootenai County Sheriff's
Office

testified

that,

after

Robert

Wyman

was

arrested

for

possession

of

methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, he instructed Mr. Wyman to call "Cecil."
(Tr., p. 98, L.15

p.99, L.4, p.107, L.5

p.108, L.9.) "Cecil" was the name by which

Mr. Wyman knew Mr. Bradley. (Tr., p.108, Ls.9-10.) Sergeant Hildebrandt testified that
Mr. Wyman made the call from an interview room at the Kootenai County Sheriff's
Office, that he was there the entire time Mr. Wyman was speaking, and that he recorded
the call. (Tr., p.108, L.11 - p.109, L.7.) About half an hour to forty-five minutes later, a
second call was made. (Tr., p.110, Ls.4-8.) Sergeant Hildebrandt also recorded the
second call from the same interview room. (Tr., p.110, Ls.9-15.)
Additionally, Sergeant Hildebrandt testified during his direct examination that,
when drug deals are arranged over the telephone, in lieu of plain English the
participants often use "different words to cover what it is they are doing." (Tr., p.102,
Ls.7-11.) According to Sergeant Hildebrandt's testimony, "If they want a full ounce, it
will be a 'full' ora 'whole one."' (Tr., p.102, Ls.12-14.)

All citations to "Tr." in this brief refer to the 221-page Transcript on Appeal, which
includes transcripts of the August 5, 2013 and August 6, 2013 jury trial, the October 2,
2013 motion for new trial hearing, and the October 9, 2013 sentencing hearing.
(Tr., p.2.) All citations to other transcripts not included in the 221-page Transcript on
Appeal will include the date of the hearing in the citation.
1
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Sergeant Hildebrandt testified that he had reviewed the audio recordings of the
two calls, that they were accurate recordings of the calls, and that he recognized
Mr. Wyman's voice as one of the two voices on the calls. (Tr., p.109, L.8- p.111, L.7.)
Deputy Mark Ellis of the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office also testified that he had
reviewed the recordings, and he recognized the two voices on the recordings as
Mr. Bradley and Mr. Wyman. (Tr., p.119, Ls.2-13.)
Over Mr. Bradley's objection, the district court admitted the audio recordings into
evidence and the State published them to the jury. (Tr., p.119, Ls.14-18, p.122, L.12 p.123, L.5.) During the first call, Mr. Wyman purportedly told Mr. Bradley, "I'm going to
need a whole one." (State's Ex. 1, 00:18-00:21.) During the second call, Mr. Bradley
and Mr. Wyman supposedly agreed to meet at a Pawn 1 store in about fifteen minutes.
(State's Ex. 2, 00:33-00:46.) Mr. Bradley then purportedly asked Mr. Wyman, "Do you
want a full?" (State's Ex. 2, 00:49-00:53.) Mr. Wyman replied, "Yeah." (State's Ex. 2,
00:53-00:55.)
Deputy Ellis testified that he met with Sergeant Hildebrandt and Mr. Wyman
before going to the Pawn 1 and parking nearby. (Tr., p.115, L.6 - p.117, L.8.) About
fifteen minutes later, he saw two patrol deputies initiate a traffic stop on a blue pickup
truck and detain the driver, Mr. Bradley. (Tr., p.117, L.9 - p.118, L.11.) Deputy Ellis
testified that he searched the truck and found a can with a fake bottom inside.
(Tr., p.119, L.19 - p.120, L.3.) Upon opening the fake bottom, he found a plastic bag
containing a white crystal substance that he believed to be methamphetamine.
(Tr., p.120, Ls.6-9.)
Annie Nord, the lab manager at the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab in
Coeur d'Alene, testified that testing indicated that the crystal substance contained
3

methamphetamine. (Tr., p.139, Ls.5-1

145, Ls.10-18.) She also testified that the

of the crystal substance was

grams. (Tr., p.1

Ls.4-18.) An ounce is

28.35 grams. (Tr., p.146, Ls.19-20.)
After the end of testimony, Mr. Bradley requested that the charges be dismissed
for insufficient proof under Idaho Criminal Rule 29, the rule governing motions for a
judgment of acquittal.

(See Tr., p.151, L.23 - p.152, L.5.)

Mr. Bradley essentially

asserted that there was insufficient evidence of a sale or delivery, and that there was
insufficient evidence that Mr. Bradley had represented the weight of the substance. 2
(See Tr., p.152, Ls.12-14; see also R., pp.96-99 (Mr. Bradley's arguments for why there

was insufficient evidence); Tr., p.8, L.4 - p.10, L.5 (same).) The district court denied the
oral motion for a judgment of acquittal.

(Tr., p.152, Ls.10-20.) The jury later found

Mr. Bradley guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.171-72.)
Mr. Bradley then filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.C. §§ 19-2406(4 ), (5)
and (6), on the grounds that the audio recordings were admitted contrary to the rules of
evidence, hearsay was admitted contrary to the rules of evidence, the jury instructions
did not accurately define the crime, and the verdict was not sustainable under the
evidence presented. (R., pp.174-75.) The district court denied the motion for a new
trial. (R., pp.183-02.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a unified sentence of twelve
years, with four years fixed, and Mr. Bradley recommended a unified sentence of six
years, with the mandatory minimum of three years fixed. (R., pp.204-05.) The district

2

Mr. Bradley told the district court that his arguments in favor of granting the motion for
judgment of acquittal "are exactly the same as the [pre-trial] motion to dismiss." (See
Tr., p.152, Ls.12-15.) The district court had denied the motion to dismiss after a
hearing. (Tr., p.14, L.9 - p.15, L.8.)
4

imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with the mandatory minimum of three
fixed. (R., pp.205, 213-15.)
Mr. Bradley filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's sentencing
decision.

(R., pp.207-08.)

Mr. Bradley also filed a Motion for Stay of Sentence.

(R., pp.211-12.) The district court then issued an Order Staying Execution of Sentence

pending Mr. Bradley's appeal. (R., pp.216-17.)
Mr. Bradley subsequently filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction
of sentence. (R., p.218.) The district court denied the Rule 35 motion. (R., p.224.) On
appeal, Mr. Bradley does not challenge the denial of the Rule 35 motion. 3
The

then filed a Motion to Reconsider Stay of Execution of Sentence

(R., p.239), as well as a Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider Stay of Execution of

Sentence.

(R., pp.225-27.)

The district court then issued an Order Releasing

Defendant. (R., p.240.)
At the hearing on the State's motion to reconsider, the district court vacated the
Order Staying Execution of Sentence and the Order Releasing Defendant. (R., pp.24851.) The district court then notified Mr. Bradley that he could file a new motion for stay
of sentence with the district court or with the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., p.249.)
Mr. Bradley filed a second motion for stay of execution of judgment with the
district court. (See R., p.257.) The district court, with a new presiding judge, denied the
second motion for stay. (R., pp.255-58.)

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). "An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information." Id.
3

5

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted the audio recordings of
the telephone calls into evidence, because the State did not provide proper
foundation to admit them?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bradley's oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29
motion for judgment of acquittal, because the evidence presented to the jury was
insufficient to convict him of trafficking in methamphetamine?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
twelve years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Bradley following his conviction for
trafficking in methamphetamine?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted The Audio Recordings Of The
Telephone Calls Into Evidence, Because The State Did Not Provide Proper Foundation
To Admit Them
Mr. Bradley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
the audio recordings of the telephone calls into evidence, because the State did not
provide proper foundation to admit them. The State did not provide proper foundation to
admit the recordings into evidence because it did not sufficiently authenticate them.
The State did not sufficiently authenticate the recordings because it did not show they
were complete and accurate representations of the telephone conversations. The State
will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in
admitting the recordings into evidence is harmless.

Mr. Bradley's conviction should

therefore be vacated.
Alternatively, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Bradley's
motion for a new trial, because the district court erred in deciding a question of law
arising during the course of the trial, when it admitted the audio recordings of the
telephone calls into evidence. Mr. Bradley is entitled to a new trial because the error
affected a substantial right.

A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted The Audio Recordings
Into Evidence
Mr. Bradley objected to the admission of the audio recordings because proper

foundation had not been laid for their admission. (Tr., p.136, Ls.1-15.) As Mr. Bradley's
counsel explained, "No one was able to testify that either one of those exhibits
completely, fairly, and accurately represented the entire conversation between those
7

people.

All you had was

enforcement officers saying they recognized

That's it. They can't lay the foundation
CDs."

(Tr., p.136, Ls.4-10.)

for the admission of those

The district court found "there is sufficient foundation

between the two officers to establish the authenticity and the completeness of the
record," and overruled the objection. (Tr., p.137, Ls.2-8.) However, the State actually
did not provide proper foundation to admit the recordings into evidence because it did
not sufficiently authenticate them.

1.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law

"The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its
judgment will

reversed on appeal only when there has been an abuse of discretion."

State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 34 (1997). "Whether evidence admitted by the trial court is

supported by a proper foundation is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard."
Id. When a district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate

court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the district court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the district court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it, and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
Because the State contended that the audio recordings were of telephone
conversations between Mr. Bradley and Mr. Wyman, the State had to provide proper
foundation for their admission into evidence. See State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 15 (2013).
Thus, the State had to authenticate the recordings.

See id.

The Idaho Rules of

Evidence provide that: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
8

matter in question is what its proponent claims."

I.R.

901 (a).

One

of

"authentication conforming with the requirements of this rule" is "[t]estimony of a witness
with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be."

I.R.E. 901 (b)(1 ).

Another

example is a telephone conversation "by evidence that a call was made to the number
assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular person . . . if . . .
circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one
called." I.R.E. 901 (b )(6)(A).
Idaho civil case law suggests that whether audio recordings were complete and
accurate impacts whether the recordings have been sufficiently authenticated.

See

Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 770-71 (2011);
Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 737-38 (Ct. App. 2006). This proposition accords
with the approach taken by some of Idaho's neighboring jurisdictions with respect to
authenticating audio recordings.

For example, the Washington Supreme Court has

outlined the following requirements for the admission of tape recordings:
(1) It must be shown that the mechanical transcription device was capable
of taking testimony. (2) It must be shown that the operator of the device
was competent to operate the device. (3) The authenticity and correctness
of the recording must be established. (4) It must be shown that changes,
additions, or deletions have not been made. (5) The manner of
preservation of the record must be shown. (6) Speakers must be
identified. (7) It must be shown that the testimony elicited was freely and
voluntarily made, without any kind of duress.

State v. Smith, 540 P.2d 424, 428 (Wash. 1975) (quoting State v. Williams, 301 P.2d
769, 772 (Wash. 1956)). Similar rules have been adopted by courts in Oregon, State v.

Miller, 487 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (Or. Ct. App. 1971) (applying the same seven
requirements from Smith), and Utah, Chen v. Stewart, 123 P .3d 416, 426 (Utah 2005)
("While a proponent may find it beneficial to demonstrate most, if not all, of the factors
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discussed in State v. Smith, [540 P.2d 424,

(\Nash. 1975)], he is not required to do

so as long as the evidence is otheiwise sufficient.")

2.

The State Did Not Provide Proper Foundation To Admit The Audio
Recordings Into Evidence, Because It Did Not Sufficiently Authenticate
Them

The State did not provide proper foundation to admit the audio recordings into
evidence, because it did not sufficiently authenticate them. With the above standards
from Idaho and neighboring jurisdictions in mind, the State did not sufficiently
authenticate the recordings here because it did not show they were complete and
accurate representations of the telephone conversations. Contrary to the district court's
determination, the officers' testimony did not establish the accuracy and completeness
of the recordings.

Although Sergeant Hildebrandt testified that the recordings were

accurate (Tr., p.109, Ls.20-23, p.110, L.25 - p.111, L.2), on cross examination he
testified that he did not clearly hear the entirety of both sides of the phone conversations
while they were going on. (Tr., p.113, L.18 - p.114, L.16.) Sergeant Hildebrandt stated,
"I could hear part of what was being said on the other end of the line, but I couldn't hear
every word."

(Tr., p.113, Ls.20-21.)

Additionally, while Sergeant Hildebrandt

recognized Mr. Wyman's voice (Tr., p.111, Ls.6-7), he testified that he did not recognize
the other voice, but the phone number called was identified as "Cecil" on Mr. Wyman's
phone. (Tr., p.111, Ls.12-25.)
Deputy Ellis testified that he recognized the two voices on the audio recordings
as Mr. Bradley and Mr. Wyman, (Tr., p.119, Ls.2-13), and that he came to recognize
Mr. Bradley's voice after speaking with him in the parking lot of the Pawn 1. (Tr., p.118,
L.22 - p.119, L.1.) However, on cross examination, Deputy Ellis testified that he was in

10

an adjacent part of the jail during the first call, and that he was not at the jail

all when

call occurred. (Tr., p.127, Ls.5-16.)
Thus, the State did not sufficiently authenticate the audio recordings because it
did not show they were complete and accurate representations of the telephone
conversations. See Harris, Inc., 151 Idaho at 770-71; Alderson, 142 Idaho at 737-38;

see also Smith, 540 P.2d at 428 (holding that the accuracy and correctness of a tape
recording must be established to admit the recording into evidence). While Sergeant
Hildebrandt was present with Mr. Wyman during the calls, he testified that he did not
clearly hear both sides of the conversations.

(See Tr., p.113, L.18 - p.114, L.16.)

Thus, Sergeant Hildebrandt's testimony did not establish that the recordings were
accurate and complete, because it could not show "that

Smith, 540 P.2d at 428.

not

additions, or deletions
Because Sergeant Hildebrandt

"couldn't hear every word" on the other end of the line (see Tr., p.113, Ls.21-22), he
was unable to confirm that the recordings' representations of what was said on the other
end of the line during the conversations was complete and accurate.
Deputy EIiis's testimony also did not establish that the audio recordings were
accurate and complete. He was not even present in the interview room for either call.

(See Tr., p.127, Ls.5-16.) His testimony about identifying the voices on the recordings
therefore did

not establish

that the

recordings were

complete

and

accurate

representations, because it could not show "that changes, additions, or deletions have
not been made" to either side of the conversations.

See Smith, 540 P.2d at 428.

Because Deputy Ellis was not present for the calls when they occurred, he had no way
to know if any alterations had been made to the recordings. Thus, because the State

11

that the recordings were complete and accurate representations, it did not

did

sufficiently authenticate the recordings.
Because the State did not sufficiently authenticate the audio recordings, it did not
provide proper foundation to admit the recordings into evidence. Thus, the district court
abused its discretion when it admitted the recordings into evidence.

3.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That The
District Court's Error In Admitting The Audio Recordings Is Harmless

The State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district
court's error in admitting the audio recordings is harmless. Once a defendant appealing
from an objected-to error has shown that the error occurred, "the State shall have the
burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). 'To meet that burden, the State must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained." Joy, 155 Idaho at 11 (2013).
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial
later held to have been erroneous.... To say that an error did not
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as
revealed in the record.
Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991 ), overruled in part on other grounds

by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991 )). 'Thus, an appellate court's inquiry

'is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was
surely unattributable to the error."' Id. (quoting Sul/ivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279
(1993)) (emphasis in original).

12

Rather than being harmless, the district court's error in admitting the audio
recordings into evidence here is

The State will not be able to establish that

the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the admission of the
recordings into evidence contributed to the verdict. The State's theory of the case was
that Mr. Bradley "represented" that the weight of the substance was 28 grams or more
pursuant to I.C. § 27-27328(c). (See Tr., p.95, Ls.15-24, p.96, L.14 - p.97, L.8.) In its
closing argument, the State told the jury, "You've probably realized by now there is
really only one issue in this particular case, and that issue [is] was there a
representation here." (Tr., p.165, Ls.13-16.)
The audio recordings were crucial to the State's case against Mr. Bradley,
because they ostensibly provided evidence that Mr. Bradley represented the weight of
the substance.

The State invoked the recordings numerous times during its closing

argument, telling the jury that the "whole one" and "full" statements from the recordings
were two of the "three pieces of evidence to consider when you are thinking about
whether or not there is the proof" that Mr. Bradley represented the weight.

(See

Tr., p.168, L.16 - p.169, L.13.) Regarding the recording of the second call, the State
told the jury, "I'm sure you will probably want to listen to this again." (Tr., p.168, L.21.)
According to the State, the second call contained Mr. Bradley's representation, and the
first call provided corroboration.

(Tr., p.168, L.18 - p.169, L.13.)

Because the

recordings were crucial to the State's case, it cannot be said that the erroneous
admission of the recordings "did not contribute to the verdict obtained." See Joy, 155
Idaho at 11. Thus, the State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
district court's error in admitting the recordings is harmless.
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The district court
and the

its
will

when it admitted the audio recordings into

unable to

beyond a reasonable doubt that the

district court's error in admitting the recordings is harmless. Mr. Bradley's conviction
should be vacated.

8.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Bradley's Motion For
A New Trial
After the trial, Mr. Bradley filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.C. §§ 19-

2406(4 ), (5) and (6) on four grounds, the relevant ground here being that the audio
recordings were admitted contrary to the rules of evidence.

(R., pp.174-75.)

The

district court found "that the State laid a proper foundation that the recorded phone calls
represented a true and accurate depiction of the recorded conversations." (R., p.190.)
Thus, the district court concluded "that Defendant is not entitled to a new trial based
upon the admission of the recordings." (R., p.190.) However, the district court abused
its discretion when it denied Mr. Bradley's motion for a new trial, because the district
court actually erred in deciding a question of law arising during the course of the trial
when it admitted the audio recordings of the telephone calls into evidence. The district
court's error entitles Mr. Bradley to a new trial, because the error affected a
substantial right.

1.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law

An appellate court reviews a denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 72 (2011 ). "Because a motion for new trial
involves mixed questions of law and fact, an abuse of discretion will be found if the trial
court's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or if the trial court does
not correctly apply the law." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
14

Idaho Code § 19-2406 "sets forth the only grounds permitting the grant of a new
trial and, therefore, limits

instances in which the trial

discretion may be

exercised." State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 674 (1997). While Idaho Criminal Rule 34
allows a trial court to grant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice," the rule
"simply states the standard that the trial court must apply when it considers the statutory
grounds." Id. Among the statutory grounds for the grant of the new trial are "[w]hen the
court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of any
question of law arising during the course of the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(5).

2.

The District Court Erred In Deciding A Question Of Law Arising During the
Course Of The Trial When It Admitted The Audio Recordings Into
Evidence, Because The State Did !'Jot Provide Proper Foundation To
Admit Them

Here, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Bradley's motion
for a new trial, because the district court erred in deciding a question of law arising
during the course of the trial when it admitted the audio recordings of the telephone
calls into evidence. As explained above, the district court abused its discretion when it
admitted the recordings into evidence, because the State did not provide proper
foundation to admit them. Mr. Bradley incorporates his above discussion herein, which
shows that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the recordings into
evidence. Thus, the district court erred in deciding this question of law arising during
the course of the trial. See I.C. § 19-2406(5).

3.

Mr. Bradley Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The District Court's Error
Affected A Substantial Right

The district court's error entitles Mr. Bradley to a new trial, because the error
affected a substantial right. "In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding the admission
15

of evidence, a new trial is merited only if the error

a substantial right of one of the

parties." Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 426 (Ct App. 2001) (citing I.C.R. 61; Highland
Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 345 (1999)). The analysis for whether an error
has affected a substantial right is closely related to the analysis for harmless error: "The
determination of whether a substantial right has been affected hinges on whether it
appears from the record that the error contributed to the verdict." State v. Rupp, 118
Idaho 17, 19 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311, 315
(Ct. App. 1988)).
As discussed above, the audio recordings were crucial to the State's case
against Mr. Bradley, and it cannot be said that the error "did not contribute to the verdict
obtained."

See Joy, 155 Idaho at 11.

substantial right.

Thus, the district court's error affected a

See Rupp, 118 Idaho at 19. Mr. Bradley is therefore entitled to a

new trial.
In sum, because the district court erred in deciding a question of law arising
during the course of the trial, when it admitted the audio recordings into evidence, the
district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Bradley's motion for a new trial.
The district court's error entitles Mr. Bradley to a new trial, because the error affected a
substantial right. Mr. Bradley's conviction should be vacated and his case should be
remanded to the district court for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bradley's Oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29
Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal, Because The Evidence Presented To The Jury Was
Insufficient To Convict Him Of Trafficking In Methamphetamine
Mr. Bradley asserts that the district court erred when it denied his oral Idaho
Criminal Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, because the evidence presented to
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jury was insufficient to convict him of trafficking in methamphetamine.
cou

denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal should be

district
and

Mr. Bradley's conviction should be vacated.
The relevant ground for Mr. Bradley's motion for judgment of acquittal was that
there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Bradley had represented the weight of the
substance. (See Tr., p.152, Ls.12-14; see a/so R., pp.96-99 (Mr. Bradley's arguments
for why there was insufficient evidence); Tr., p.8, L.4

p.10, L.5 (same).) The district

court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. (Tr., p.152, Ls.10-20.) However, the
evidence presented to the jury was actually insufficient to convict Mr. Bradley of
trafficking in methamphetamine.

A.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
The standard of review for the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal "is

whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho
679, 684 (2004 ). Substantial evidence exists when "a reasonable mind could conclude
that a defendant's guilt as to such material evidence of the offense was proven beyond
a reasonable doubt."

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The appellate court

conducts an independent review of the record to determine if there is no evidence upon
which a guilty verdict could be based.

Id.

Where there is competent but conflicting

evidence to sustain the verdict, the appellate court may not reweigh that evidence or
disturb the verdict. Id. The appellate court will take all reasonable inferences in favor of
the prosecution. Id.
The methamphetamine trafficking provision of the trafficking statute under which
Mr. Bradley was charged provides that:
17

Any person who knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or who is
knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams
or more of methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or
amphetamine is guilty of a felony, which felony shall be known as
"trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine."
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4 ). The trafficking statute also states that, "For the purposes
of subsections (a) and (b) of this section the weight of the controlled substance as
represented by the person selling or delivering it is determinative if the weight as
represented is greater than the actual weight of the controlled substance." I.C. § 3727328(c).

B.

The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Verdict, Because There
Was No Substantial Evidence Upon Which The Jury Could Have Found The
Essential Element Of Weight Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Bradley asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's

verdict. Specifically, there was no substantial evidence upon which the jury could have
found the essential element of the weight of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt.
The substance weighed 27.63 grams (Tr., p.146, Ls.4-18), less than the 28 grams
generally required by the trafficking statute. See I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4). Thus, to prove
the essential element of the weight of the substance, the State had to show under § 372732B( c) that Mr. Bradley represented that the weight was 28 grams or more.
Whether Mr. Bradley "represented" the weight of the substance within the
meaning of the trafficking statute is an issue of statutory interpretation.

Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App. 2000). 4

Cf. State v.

The interpretation of a statute is a

In Escobar, the Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted I.C. § 37-2732B(c) as "mak[ing] no
distinction between offenses that involve a completed delivery and those that do not."
Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389. According to the Court, "under subsections [(a)(4)] and (c),
a defendant may be convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine if the defendant
represented the weight of the delivered substance to be twenty-eight grams or more,
4
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question of law, over which appellate courts

free review. State v. Hart, 135

(2001 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has outlined the following rules of

Idaho

statutory interpretation. "The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words
of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and
the statute must be construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alp hons us Reg'/ Med. Ctr.,
151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"If the statute is not

ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." 5 Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

"We have consistently held that where statutory

language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be
consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). 'The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation
cannot modify its plain meaning."

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellate

courts do not have authority to revise or void "an unambiguous statute on the ground
that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written."
Id. at 896.

"If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to

correct it is legislative, not judicial." Id. at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Title 37 of the Idaho Code does not define "represented." See I.C. § 37-2701.
This does not mean Section 37-2732B(c) is ambiguous, because the plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning of "represented" may be gleaned from other sources.

The most

relevant definition of "representation" from the latest edition of Black's Law Dictionary
provides that a "representation" is "[a] presentation of fact-either by words or by

even if the actual weight was less." Id. The defendant in Escobar was charged under
the methamphetamine trafficking provision of the trafficking statute before it was
renumbered to I.C. § 27-2732B(a)(4). Id. at 388 n.1.
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conduct-made to induce someone to

to

into a contract; esp., the

manifestation to another that a fact, including a state of mind,

" Representation,

Black's Law Dictionary (9 th ed. 2009). The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary's most
relevant definition of "represent" provides that tt1e term means "to describe as having a
specified character or quality."

Represent, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/represent (last accessed on Aug. 8, 2014.)
Applying the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "represented" from the above
sources shows that there was insufficient evidence on the weight element because
Mr. Bradley did not represent the weight of the substance. As explained above in Part I
of the Argument, the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the audio
recordings of the telephone calls into evidence, because the State did not provide
proper foundation to admit them. Without the recordings, the State would have had no
evidence that Mr. Bradley represented anything to Mr. Wyman, much less than he
represented the weight of the substance.
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the audio
recordings into evidence, there was insufficient evidence on the weight element. Under
the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "represented," Mr. Bradley did not represent
the weight of the evidence. Mr. Bradley never presented as fact, through his words or
conduct, that the substance weighed an ounce (which equals 28.35 grams).

While

there was testimony from Sergeant Hildebrandt on how cover words were often used
during drug deals in general (Tr., p.102, Ls.7-17), there was no testimony showing that
Mr. Bradley or Mr. Wyman understood that a "full" or a "whole one" meant an ounce.

5

"A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction. An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable interpretation."
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Further, Mr. Bradley's actions in going to the agreed-upon location with the
substance in his truck did not represent the weight of the substance.

At

Mr. Bradley's conduct represented that he had the substance in his possession, but the
conduct did not present or describe its weight. As Mr. Bradley's counsel put it at the
hearing on the pretrial motion to dismiss, 6 "Maybe if you are an Iron Man, lifting weights,
and you are grunting, you are representing that it is heavy, but you are not representing
exactly how heavy it is.
(Tr., p.13, Ls.14-17.)

You are not going to represent a weight by your actions."

In short, Mr. Bradley did not represent the weight of the

substance. Thus, there was insufficient evidence on the weight element to convict.
Because there was no substantial evidence upon which the jury could have
found the essential element of the weight of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt,
the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The district court therefore
erred when it denied Mr. Bradley's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. The district
court's denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal should be reversed and
Mr. Bradley's conviction should be vacated.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Twelve
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Following Mr. Bradley's Conviction For Trafficking
In Methamphetamine
Mr. Bradley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
his unified sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed, because the indeterminate
portion of the sentence is excessive. Mr. Bradley does not challenge the fixed portion of

6

Mr. Bradley's counsel incorporated this line of reasoning into his arguments on the
Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, because he told the district court that his
arguments in favor of granting the motion for judgment of acquittal "are exactly the
same as the motion to dismiss." (See Tr., p.152, Ls.12-15.)
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his sentence, because the applicable mandatory minimum is three
2732B(a)(4)(A).

The district court should have

I.C. § 37-

imposed an indeterminate

portion of three years, as Mr. Bradley requested.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving "due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Bradley does not allege that his sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Bradley
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

Id.

An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ...

consider[sJ the defendant's entire sentence."

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726

(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id.
Mr. Bradley submits that, because the district court did not give adequate
consideration to mitigating factors, the indeterminate portion of his sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

Specifically, the district court did not

adequately consider Mr. Bradley's substance abuse problems.
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The Idaho Supreme

rt has recognized substance abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a

to be excessive.

See, e.g., State v. Nice, 1

Idaho 89, 91 (1

Mr. Bradley has been diagnosed with alcohol abuse and amphetamine dependence.
(PSI, p.25.)

He started using alcohol when he was fourteen years old, and

amphetamines when he was thirty-two. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.26.)
He reported using alcohol about twice a month, but would consume twelve beers in a
sitting. (PSI, p.26.) He reported using methamphetamine about twice a week. (PSI,
p.26.) Many of the entries in Mr. Bradley's criminal history, such as his six DUls, are
related to his substance abuse problems.

(See PSI, pp.5-15, 22.)

However,

Mr. Bradley now recognizes that, as he told the district court during the sentencing
hearing, he is "in fact an alcoholic and a drug addict." (Tr., p.216, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Bradley
now desires rehabilitation to help him avoid the poor choices he has made. (Tr., p.216,
L.13

p.217, L.6.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Bradley's substance abuse problems

should have led to a lesser indeterminate portion of the sentence.
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Bradley's difficult
childhood. Mr. Bradley's first memories of his parents together involved the two of them
drinking, and a lot of arguing. (PSI, p.16.) He described his father as a "bad alcoholic."
(PSI, p.16.) When Mr. Bradley was twelve years old, his father left and was murdered
in Alaska. (PSI, p.16.) His mother continued to drink while she took care of Mr. Bradley
and his brother. (PSI, p.16.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Bradley's difficult childhood
should have led to a lesser indeterminate portion of the sentence.
Perhaps most importantly, the district court did not give adequate consideration
to how, despite his substance abuse problems and difficult childhood, Mr. Bradley
contributes in many ways to his family and community. Jessica Bolton, Mr. Bradley's
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girlfriend, reported that Mr. Bradley "will do anything to help anyone." (Sealed
p.138.)7

His friends wrote the district court letters describing how Mr. Bradley is "a

loving attentive father and son and a great friend" (Sealed Exs., p.139), "a very caring
father" and "a very unselfish friend with a great deal of consideration for others" (Sealed
Exs., p.140) and "a hard worker and willing to go the extra mile" (Sealed Exs., p.141 ).
Virginia Morgan, a sixty-seven-year-old disabled widow, reported that Mr. Bradley "has
always been there" when she asked for his help. (Sealed Exs., p.142.)
Mr. Bradley's friends and family describe him as a good man who has made
mistakes, and is now willing to take responsibility for and learn from those mistakes.
His mother, Donna Ray Bradley, stated that Mr. Bradley "is a person of good moral
character. . . . I have seen
convinced that
original).)

go through ups and downs, but all the while I have been

is a decent person at the core." (Sealed Exs., p.137 (emphasis in

Ms. Bradley wrote, "Dwayne has made mistakes, and he is incredibly

remorseful, and is willing to do whatever it takes to make preparations, financially and
emotionally, if possible."

(Sealed Exs., p.137 (emphases in original).)

Similarly,

Ms. Bolton stated that "Dwayne is not a threat to the public or a flight risk and if given
the chance he will prove that to you with his actions from here on out." (Sealed Exs.,
p.138.) One of Mr. Bradley's friends wrote that "I truly believe with some supervision, a
little help, and the desire I believe Dwayne has to be a good father and productive
member of society that he will make every effort to get his life back on track." (Sealed
Exs., p.139.)
Mr. Bradley would not have received such support from his friends and family if
he did not enrich their lives.

7

Despite his mistakes, Mr. Bradley contributes in many

All citations to the Sealed Exhibits refer to the 142-page PDF document.
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his family and community.

Adequate consideration of those contributions

in a
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating
factors, the indeterminate portion of Mr. Bradley's sentence is excessive considering
any view of the facts.

Thus, Mr. Olson submits that the district court abused its

discretion when it imposed the unified sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Bradley respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his conviction. Alternatively, Mr. Bradley respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
conviction and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Bradley respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial of the motion for judgment of
acquittal and vacate his conviction. Alternatively, Mr. Bradley respectfully requests that
this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 1 fh day of August, 2014.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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